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Abstract
Carbon tax polices in a country are often criticized as leading to
production shifting to other unregulated countries (”carbon leak”). We
analyze here the di↵erent impact on leakages and trade of a carbon tax
and of an emission permit policy enacted by one country (the ”home”
country) in a two country model of price competition with di↵erenti-
ated products.
A lower carbon leak, a reduction in global emissions, and an im-
provement in traded volumes can be achieved by means of an emission
standards, whereas a carbon tax improves the traded values; govern-
ments may have to face a trade-o↵ between leakages and trade balance.
Keywords: Carbon Leakage, Carbon Tax, Emission Permits, Trade
Balance, Price Competition
1 Introduction
E↵orts by industrialized countries to reduce polluting emissions have
been accompanied by concerns over the e↵ectiveness of unilateral measures,
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in terms of both welfare loss and carbon leakages. It is in fact well estab-
lished in the literature that measures targeting a subset of manufacturers
within a country (Holland, 2012) or manufacturers in only a subset of coun-
tries (incomplete regulation) can induce production and emission leakages
to unregulated firms and in other countries (Paltsev, 2001), or they en-
courage domestic firms to relocate plants (Babiker, 2005). Even if recent
contributions report a decline in these trends (Barker et al., 2007; Baylis
et al., 2014; Sanna-Randaccio et al., 2014), considerable attention has been
devoted to the analysis of these ”leakages” mechanisms - several contri-
butions also analyzing countervailing measures, like border adjustments or
upstream-downstream subsidies (Fischer and Fox, 2012; Fischer et al., 2012).
A related question is which is the type of policy that minimizes leakages.
For instance, intensity standards, that set limits to carbon emissions per
unit of output, have been proved to be ine cient (Fischer, 2001; Holland
et al., 2009), since ”they cannot attain the first best, could increase carbon
emissions”, and entail ”much higher abatement costs than an e cient pol-
icy” (See Holland et al., 2009, p. 1). Still, according to Holland (2012),
intensity standards can be welfare superior to a carbon tax and allow for a
second best outcome, in the presence of incomplete regulation and leakages.
So far, most of the existing literature on carbon leakages arising from lo-
cal or incomplete regulation focuses on perfectly competitive markets. How-
ever, most issues in environmental regulation have been widely analyzed also
in the context of oligopolistic industries ((Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995;
Amacher et al., 2004; Moraga-Gonza´lez and Padro´n-Fumero, 2002) are con-
cerned with environmental qualities in a duopoly; (Toshimitsu, 2008; Kur-
tyka and Mahenc, 2011; Carlsson, 2000) deal with environmental taxation
in duopolies; (Lahiri and Ono, 2007) compare welfare under permits and
taxes; (Requate, 2006) provides a summary view). Furthermore, as argued
by Fowlie (2009), ”The majority of emissions that are currently subject to
regional, market-based regulations come from industries that are often char-
acterized as imperfectly competitive (important examples include restruc-
tured electricity markets and cement)” (See Fowlie, 2009, p. 73). Finally,
Ryan (2012) and Fowlie et al. (2012) supply evidence that concentrated in-
dustries are crucially a↵ected by environmental regulation; using data for
the U.S. Portland cement industry, the first provides an assessment of wel-
fare reductions and increase in sunk costs, and the second of the welfare
losses and ”leakages” from incomplete regulation.
Based on these considerations, in this paper we analyze the implemen-
tation of an environmental policy under imperfect competition in prices. In
the baseline version of the model we assume that firms cannot price dis-
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criminate across countries. This assumption may fit the case where leakages
occur within the same country due to incomplete regulation, while also serv-
ing as a first approximation for a two country model. In the second version
of the model we allow firms to price discriminate across countries. On top
of deriving the carbon leakages, we also consider the e↵ects on the inter-
national competitiveness of the regulated country, by assessing the impact
on its trade balance. We compare the e↵ects of the two alternative instru-
ments, a carbon tax and an emission permit (or absolute standard) whereby
a firm is allowed to a maximum quantity of emissions. We do not consider
abatement e↵orts and focus instead on the e↵ects generated by strategic
interaction in price competition. Although we think that abatement would
also be a↵ected, the focus on pricing strategies allows to reveal a channel
of ”transmission” of policies that per se is su cient to bring forth leakage
e↵ects.
Price competition is di↵erent according to the policy tool that is chosen.
The e↵ect of a carbon tax on the price reaction function of the taxed firm in
a model with di↵erentiated products is obvious and there is no surprise that
a carbon leak shall arise in that case. It is less obvious, by contrast, what is
the e↵ect on the equilibrium outcome in the case of a restriction on the quan-
tity of emissions, and it is not a priori clear whether a leak will arise or not.
An emission policy implies a constraint on the price choices by the home
firm which must set prices for its product high enough to curtail its own
demand and satisfy the emission limit. This implies that the regulated firm
must follow a rule and cannot use its best reply function, while the foreign
firm becomes a Stackelberg leader who can set its own price ”expecting” the
rival’s response to abide the constraint. In this way it is not a priori clear
whether the foreign firm will choose a price strategy to gain market shares
in volumes or just in value, or both, with possible di↵erent implications for
emissions. In our framework, firms are immobile - as in the short run or due
to technological constraints, and carbon leakages following climate policy
regulation occurs only through trade flows and not through plant relocation
(see instead Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2003; Sanna-Randaccio et al., 2014).
To enable meaningful comparisons, the policy instruments that the regula-
tor can introduce are tailored so as to guarantee the same level of emissions
in the home country. In particular, the tax level is adjusted so as to achieve
an ”equivalent tax”, namely a tax such that the equilibrium outcome entails
the same desired level of emissions in the home country as the standard.
First of all, we confirm the existing concerns over unilateral environ-
mental regulation in the case of a carbon tax, which may in fact induce an
unwanted increase in global emissions. However in our model an absolute
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standard is more likely to lead to lower emissions abroad than to leakages,
the more general message being that a standard leads to less leakage than a
tax. We then observe that the carbon tax is an inferior instrument, not only
in terms of leakage but also in terms of trade balance: this policy measure,
in fact, leads to a greater emission leakage and also induces losses in the
home country trade balance in volumes. A standard instead also leads to
possible improvements in the trade balance in volumes. The trade balance
in values, instead, deteriorates under either policy; however a carbon tax
can lead to a lower deterioration than a standard, but only if goods are very
close substitutes. The emission leak e↵ects is however always unchanged
and in favor of a standard. Overall, our findings point to the superiority of
a standard over a carbon tax.
Our findings depart from Holland (2012), where the inferiority of a stan-
dard stems from the firms changing their input compositions, choosing dif-
ferent emission levels in their cost minimization problem. In our framework
instead, the relative superiority of emission permits is intrinsic to the strate-
gic interaction occurring between the firms in the two countries.
This work is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the general model
and analyzes the simplified case of a globally integrated demand with no
price discrimination; Section 3 develops the full discrimination case and
draws the trade balance conclusions; last, Section 4 draws the main con-
clusions. In Annex I, we consider an intermediate case, with the domestic
firm discriminating between the two countries, and the foreign firm setting
a uniform price.
2 The Model
2.1 The general model
We assume that there is only one firm in the home country H and one
firm in the foreign country F, both in a polluting industrial sector. Alter-
natively, we may also think of these two firms as being located in the same
country but being subject to two di↵erent environmental regulations: one
firm may in fact belong to a regulated sector, and the other to an unregu-
lated industry producing a substitute product. In our baseline setting, we
rule out price discrimination, whereas in our international 2 country model,
firms do price discriminate across countries. The government in country H
decides to reduce domestically produced emissions to a given level, s, below
the current level achieved under an unrestricted market equilibrium. The
government can use one of two policies: either introduce a carbon tax t,
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on each unit of pollutant, or target an overall emission level, assumed to
be exogenous. Our framework di↵ers from Holland (2012), where firms can
instead choose the level of emissions e, a costless input, so as to minimize
their cost function.
The quantity of emissions per unit of production by the domestic firm
is  , with 0 <   < 1, while that of the foreign firm is set equal to 1, in
order to simplify exposition and without loss of generality. Exporting to the
other country implies a transport cost equal to ⌧ , per unit. The domestic
firm is denoted as firm 1 and the foreign firm as firm 2. Production costs
are Ci(qi) = ciqi for i = 1, 2.
The firms’ products are di↵erentiated and firms compete in prices. Prod-
uct di↵erentiation is reflected by   2 (0, 1), with   = 0 for independent
goods. We have normalized to 1 the parameter for the own price in the de-
mand function of good i, therefore we impose the realistic restriction   < 1,
namely that the own price e↵ect on demand is greater in size than the cross
e↵ect of a change in the price of the rival good.1 The inverse demand func-
tions in country H and F for i = 1, 2 with i 6= j are, respectively:
Dhi (p
h
i , p
h
j ) = A+  p
h
j   phi (1)
Dfi (p
f
i , p
f
j ) = B +  p
f
j   pfi (2)
where phi , p
f
i represent the prices quoted by firm i in country H and F
respectively.
A carbon tax is a unit tax on emissions. The only firm paying the tax
under a tax policy is the home firm. The carbon tax implies an increase in
the marginal cost of production for the home firm from c1to c1 +  t, given
the exogenous emission rate  .
The emission permit, by contrast, sets an implicit limit on production
by the home firm:2 if the level of allowed emissions is s, that is q  = s, total
production by the home firm cannot exceed the quantity s/ . Emissions
above this floor imply a penalty, w, with w = k+ !(e  s). Hence, to avoid
the emission penalty, firm 1 must choose the price pair (ph1 , p
f
1) that satisfies
1We work with inverse demand functions. A similar interpretation can be obtained
starting from direct demand functions where qi = a qi  qj , for i = 1, 2. The parameter  
in (0,1) reflects the degree of substitutability between goods, with perfect substitutability
obtained when   tends to 1 and independent goods when   = 0. Our parameter   is
equivalent to  /(1   ). Our main results hold if   is replaced by  /(1   ).
2Our emission permit policy di↵ers from an intensity standard policy, as the regulation
target is the total level of emissions s rather the unitary polluting content  .
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the following constraint:
A+B +  (ph2 + p
f
2)  ph1   pf1  s/ . (3)
For the remaining of the analysis we shall assume that the foreign country is
not adopting any policy concerning emissions - or that firm 2 is not subject
to regulation. It follows that production will increase abroad and decrease
at home, after the anti-emission policies, determining a carbon leak. Carbon
leak is usually defined as the ratio between the changes in emissions, as in
Fischer and Fox (2012). In our analysis, we instead compare two alternative
policies that generate the same level of emissions by firm 1. In this frame-
work, carbon leak would be the ratio between the changes in emissions by
the two firms under these two scenarios (indexed by i).
 ei2   ei1   .
By definition the denominator is the same in either case. As such, our
carbon leak measures essentially compares the changes in emissions by firm
2 under the two policy scenario, namely  ect2 and  e
st
2 .
2.2 A simplified case
In the present sub-section, we shall analyze the case where each firm
quotes the same price at home and abroad, although we do not rule out
cost asymmetries. Further we eliminate transportation costs. The general
model in the next section allows firms to price discriminate across countries
so that each firm chooses two prices, although in order to simplify we shall
then impose symmetric costs.
Since no price discrimination is possible and no transportation cost ex-
ists, the two countries can be viewed as a single market and total demand
to firm 1 and 2 can be defined as, respectively,
Di(pi, pj) =M +  pj   pi, for i = 1, 2, i 6= j
where we preserve the notation   for the substitutability parameter, for
convenience. The cost functions are Ci(qi) = ciqi, for i = 1, 2 and with
ci < M . The best reply functions in the game where no policies are adopted
by either country are
pi = (1/2) (M + ci +  pj) for i, j = 1, 2. (4)
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The Nash equilibrium prices are easily derived as:
p⇤i = [M(2 +  ) + 2ci +  cj ]/(4   2), for i 6= j, and i, j = 1, 2. (5)
Total quantities produced in equilibrium are
q⇤i =
⇥ 
M(2 +  )  ci(2   2) +  cj
 ⇤
/
 
4   2  . (6)
Total quantity is
q⇤ = [2M   (c1 + c2) (1   )] /(2   ).
Finally, the equilibrium profits are ⇡⇤1 = (q⇤1)
2 and ⇡⇤2 = (q⇤2)
2.
2.2.1 Emission permits
Suppose now that country H sets an emission permit up to s. The
constraint forces firm 1 to set a price high enough so that demand for its
product satisfies the constraint  q1(p1, p2) < s or  (M +  p2   p1) < s.
This can be rewritten as p1   M +  p2   ✓, where ✓ ⌘ s/  is a convenient
notation. As part of the policy one can assume that an output exceeding
s/  can only be produced with the additional cost of a penalty on emissions.
We shall assume this penalty to be high enough to make it worthwhile for
the firm to respect the target at equilibrium - otherwise the policy design
would fail. The level of s (or of ✓) here must be such that ✓ < q⇤1 where q⇤1
is defined by (6). The penalty w is assumed to be a function of emissions in
excess of s, namely w(e) = k + !(e  s), where e =  q1. Let the function
Bu1 (p2) = (M + c1 +  p2)(1/2) (7)
denote the unconstrained best reply for firm 1 when no policy is imple-
mented. Bu1 (p2) is a linear function of p2. Further, if s is such that
M   (s/ ) < (1/2)(M + c1), or M   c1 < 2✓, then the constraint ex-
pressed as the function p1 = C(p2) ⌘ M +  p2   ✓ crosses from below the
function Bu1 (p2), at the value p2 = (2✓  M + c1) /  ⌘ p20. Otherwise, if
M   c1 > 2✓, the constraint lies above the function Bu1 (p2) for all p2 > 0,
but the algebra would not be altered. Therefore, the profit maximization
program for firm 1 respecting the emission target is modified as
max
p1
(p1   c1) (M +  p2   p1) s.t. M +  p2   p1  ✓ (8)
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The maximization program if the firm exceeds the constraint is
max
p1
(p1   c1)✓ + (p1   c1   !)q(p1, p2, ✓)  k
where the function q(.) is defined as q(✓, p2, p1) = max[(M+ p2 p1 ✓), 0].
The best reply for firm 1 when it violates the constraint and pays the
penalty lies along the best reply of firm 1 under a simple tax on emissions,
given by B1(p2,!) = Bu1 (p2) + ( !) /2, where the tax rate would be !.The
constraint crosses this line at the point with horizontal coordinate p2R ⌘
(2✓  M + c1 +  !) / . However, firm 1 will adopt this reply function only
for a price by firm 2 above p2R as it shall be clarified shortly.
Hence the best reply for firm 1, considering also the constrained part, is
CB1(p2) =
8><>:
Bu1 (p2) = (1/2)(M + c1) + ( /2)p2 for 0  p2  p20
C(p2) =M +  p2   ✓ for p20 < p2 < p2R + ⌘
B1(p2,!) = (1/2)(M + c1 +  !) + ( /2)p2 for p2R + ⌘ < p2.
(9)
The functions Bu1 (p2), B1(p2,!) and the constraint C(p2) are represented
in Figure 1 below, for the case where M   c1 < 2✓, where in the graph,
T = M   ✓. The constrained best reply CB1(p2) is a piecewise linear
function represented as the thick line with a kink at the point p20 and a
discontinuity at the point p2R + ⌘.3 The admissible values for p1 satisfying
the constraint depend upon the policy measure, ✓, and upon p2. The idea
here is that firm 1, when its unconstrained best reply, B1(p1), leads to a
penalty for over-emissions, will choose p1 so as to satisfy the constraint
exactly.
We shall assume that the constraint be binding, least the policy would
fail its objective in terms of emissions in the home country. In this case,
firm 2 acts as a Stackelberg leader, choosing p2 knowing that p1 shall be set
so as to satisfy the constraint. Hence the maximization problem for firm 2
is
max
p2
(p2   c2) (M +   (M +  p2   ✓)  p2) .
The profit maximizing price for 2 is
pˆ2 =
⇥
M(1 +  )  ✓  + c2(1   2)
⇤
/(2  2 2)
and p1 is determined by the constraint as p1 =M +  pˆ2   ✓ or
3Firm 1 does not switch to the best reply B1(p1) +  !/2 for a price p2 = p2R because
of the fixed part in the penalty, k. It would do so only if k was equal to zero.
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Figure 1: Constrained optimization
pˆ1 =
M(2 +      2)  ✓(2   2) +  c2(1   2)
(1   2) .
Under the standard, equilibrium production by firm 2 is given by q2(s) =
(1/2)
⇥
M(1 +  )  ✓    c2(1   2)
⇤
, and total production by both firms is
Q(s) = (1/2)
⇥
M(1 +  ) + ✓(2   )  c2(1   2)
⇤
The quantity (and emissions) produced in country F increases by the
amount q2(s)  q⇤, where q⇤ is given by equation (6).
Therefore,
 est2 =  
M(1   )
2(2   ) +  
 c2(3   2)  2c1
2(4   2)  
✓ 
2
. (10)
For   tending to zero  est2 goes to zero. Further, one can show that
for reasonable di↵erences in marginal costs, the change in production and
hence in emissions by firm 2 is negative for a wide range of values for s and
therefore for ✓: a negative leakage implies that policy in country H has a
positive spillover in terms of global reduction. Neglecting the term in costs,
a carbon leak can occur only if ✓ is lower than M(1    )/(2    ) ⌘ ✓0,
which is a very low production level for firm 1, given that the unconstrained
production would be q⇤ as defined above . For instance if costs were zero,
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q⇤ =M/(2  ) and ✓/q⇤ should be lower than (1  ), or s/( q⇤) < (1  ); a
percentage reduction in emissions lower than commonly required by policies
unless   is very low (say less than 0.1). This, however, does not exclude that
carbon leakage can occur under a permit policy, though it looks unlikely to
happen in our model, under reasonable assumptions. These considerations
shall be summarized after a comparison with a tax policy is completed.
We shall compare the change in emissions under a standard with the
carbon leak obtained under the carbon tax - levied only on firm 1 - which
provides an emission reduction exactly equal to a given standard policy s.
2.2.2 Competition under a carbon tax
We shall now assume that on each unit of emission produced by firm 1 the
government in country H levies a tax equal to t, so that the marginal cost of
firm 1 raises to  t. No other restriction is imposed. The profit maximization
program for firm 1 results in the best reply function given in (9), where c1
must be replaced by c1t ⌘ c1 +  t. The equilibrium prices and quantities
can be easily derived by appropriately rewriting the solutions in (5) and
the following equations. The equilibrium quantity by firm 1 in particular is
given as a function of t, q⇤1(t) =
⇥
M(2 +  )  c1t(2   2) +  c2
⇤
(4    2) 1.
It is su cient to set this quantity equal to s/  in order to find t(s), the
tax that brings forth an equilibrium quantity of emissions equal to s. The
solution, recalling that s/  = ✓ is
tˆ =
M(2 +  )
(2   2) +
 
 c2   ✓(4   2)
 
(2   2)   c1
It is immediate to see that tˆ is positive as far as the limit on emissions
is binding, namely as far as  q⇤1 > s (or equivalently q⇤1 > ✓). It is therefore
straightforward to compute the Nash price equilibrium and the equilibrium
quantities. Since by simple computations, q⇤2(t) = q⇤2 + t( /(2 +  )), it is
obvious that since tˆ is positive, a tax policy does arise a carbon leak.
2.2.3 Comparison of policies
By comparing the increase in production in the foreign country under
the two regimes we can state that the carbon leak under a carbon tax is
larger than under an emission permit.
Proposition 1 If price discrimination is not allowed (or firms sell in the
same country), a standard policy that reduces emissions by the regulated firm
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to a target level s entails a lower carbon leak than an equivalent carbon tax t.
Furthermore, setting the target reduction not above 50% of the unregulated
level is su cient to guarantee that a standard leads to lower emissions by
the foreign competitor.
The intuition is that a quantity restriction under price competition allows
the unregulated firm (the foreign firm) to exploit the regulation by choosing
the point on the constrained price reaction function of the rival as in a
Stackelberg game. This price manipulation favors the profit extraction by
the unregulated firm with respect to the carbon tax that leads to equivalent
equilibrium emissions in the home country. In a sense, the unregulated
firm gains more in value and less in volumes when it exploits the restriction
imposed on firm 1.
Remark 1 A unilateral carbon tax may lead to an increase in global emis-
sions.
If price discrimination is impossible, the reduction in emissions at home is
equal to q⇤ ✓, while the increase abroad under a tax is [ /(1 +  )] tˆ. Simple
computations show that this sum is positive as far as q⇤   ✓ is positive, e.g.
as far as the restriction on emissions is binding for the regulated firm.
3 The two country model
In this section, we assume again that there are two firms located in two
di↵erent countries, the home and the foreign one respectively, and each firm
can supply its product in both countries.4 Firms can now price discriminate
across countries. Demand functions in the two countries are given by (1)
and (2). Production and transport costs are assumed to be equal to zero,
to simplify.5
When there are no emission restrictions in country H, the two firms engage
4Production only takes place in country H for firm 1 and in country F for firm 2.
5This framework could be also extended to analyze a 3-firm setting, with two symmetric
firms located in the regulated country and one firm located in the unregulated country.
The demand functions individually faced by each firm in the domestic country H are
Dh1 = A+  p3 +  p2   p1 Dh2 = A+  p3 +  p1   p2 Dh1 = A+  (p1 + p2)  p3
Since firms 1 and 2, in the home country, are perfectly symmetric, they will be allowed to
produce up to 50% of total emissions each. Since there is no trade in emission permits, the
two firms will be charging exactly the same price, and the conclusions in terms of leakage
and trade balance will be similar to those of the 2-by-2 setting.
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in price competition and the resulting equilibrium is symmetric. Prices
are pbhi = A/(2    ) and pbfi = B/(2    ) and equilibrium demands are
Dbhi = A/(2   ) and Dbfi = B/(2   ) for i = 1, 2, where the superscript b
refers to the baseline setting.
3.1 Emission permits vs. carbon tax
We now assume that an emission permit is introduced in country H:
as a consequence, total emissions by firm 1 in the regulated country can-
not exceed the emission permit ✓ = s/ . Here, given the solution to
the unconstrained competition game, for the restriction on emissions s to
lead to lower emissions, it must be true that  (A + B)/(2    ) > s, or
✓¯ ⌘ (A+B)/(2   ) > ✓. In a general form, the binding constraint for firm
1 is Dsh1 + D
sf
1 < ✓, where superscript s distinguishes the permits setting.
The constraint can be written as A + B   ✓ +  (ph2 + pf2)   ph1   pf1 = ✓
if it binds, so that it is apparent that it does not define the two prices set
by firm 1 even if the prices by the foreign firm, pf2 and p
h
2 are given. This
implies that Stackelberg leadership by firm 2 determines the position of the
constraint but that firm 1 has some leeway in adjusting the prices domes-
tically and abroad so as to maximize its profits along the constraint (The
”Maquilladora” example provided in the Annex I clarifies the mechanics of
the price setting procedure when the constraint is in three dimensions). The
Lagrangian for firm 1 is
L(ph1 , p
f
2 , ) =
⇣
A  ph1 +  ph2
⌘
ph1 +
⇣
B   pf1 +  pf2
⌘
pf1 +
 
⇣
A+B   ✓ +  (ph2 + pf2)  ph1   pf1
⌘
(11)
The ”Stackelberg follower” prices for firm 1 are
psh1 =
3A+B   2✓
4
+
1
4
 pf2 +
3
4
 ph2 (12)
psf1 =
3B +A  2✓
4
+
3
4
 pf2 +
1
4
 ph2
Firm 2 acts as Stackelberg leader, and maximizes
max
ph2 ,p
f
2
⇣
A+  psh1   ph2
⌘
ph2 +
⇣
B +  psf1   pf2
⌘
pf2 (13)
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where psh1 and p
sf
1 are as in (12). As a result,
6 in equilibrium total emissions,
which are equal to total quantities, are given by:
 Ds1 =  ✓ and D
s
2 = (1/2) [(A+B) (1 +  )  ✓ ] .
In accordance with the analysis in the baseline model, we need to deter-
mine the carbon leak when firm 1 is subject to either an emission permit or
a carbon tax. After the introduction of a carbon tax t on firm 1, we solve
for the Nash equilibrium prices,7 and find total equilibrium emissions:
 Dt1 =  
(A+B) (2 +  )  2t  2   2 
4   2 and D
t
2(t) =
(A+B) (2 +  ) + 2t 
4   2 .
We assume that the government in country H introduces a tax t such
that total emissions by firm 1 reach the desired level, that is Dt1 = ✓
8 - this
desired tax level, t˜, is the solution to 2(2   2)t˜ = (2+  )(A+B  ✓(2   )).
Hence, total emissions are
 Dt1 +D
t
2(t˜) =  ✓ + ((A+B) (1 +  )  ✓ ) /(2   2),
where subscript t denotes the carbon tax scenario.
3.2 Carbon leak and global emissions
It is now possible to compare the levels of carbon leak, as previously
defined, to assess the change in emissions in firm 2 under the two alternative
scenarios.9 The di↵erences in production by firm 2 under a tax and under
a standard are
 q2(s) =  
(A+B)(1   )  ✓(2   )
2(2   ) (14)
6See Annex II for the formal derivation.
7With firm 1 problem defined by:
max
ph1 ,p
f
1
= (ph1   t)Dh1 (ph1 , ph2 ) + (pf1   t)Df1 (pf1 , pf2 ).
8Letting g 1 = (2   )(2   2), the corresponding prices are given by the equations
pth1 = g
 
A
 
3   2 +B   ✓(2   )  , ptf1 = g  B  3   2 +A  ✓(2   ) 
pth2 =
g
2
A
 
4  2 2 +   +  (B + (    2)✓), ptf2 = g2   (A+ (    2)✓) +B   2 2 +   + 4  
9By definition, the change in emission by firm 1 is 0.
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and
 q2(t) =  
(A+B   ✓(2   ))
(2   )(2   2) . (15)
and
Dt2  Ds2 = ( /2) ((A+B) (1 +  )  ✓ ) /
 
4  2 2  . (16)
Considering that a carbon leak under a standard can be positive only for
very large reductions in emissions and since the expression in (16) is positive
as far as   > 0 and increasing in  , we can state the following result.
Proposition 2 When international price discrimination is allowed, the car-
bon leak under a tax policy is larger than under an emission standard; a
standard only leads to leakage if the target reduction in emissions is more
than 50%. The di↵erence between the two policies increases with the degree
of substitution between the foreign and domestic goods.
This result confirms the comparison obtained when price discrimination
is not allowed. As a remark, the change in global emissions under a stan-
dard policy is negative if  q2(s) +   q1 < 0, where  q2(s) is given by
(14) and where  q1 is the same under the two policies, namely equal to
  (✓   (A+B)/(2   )). Since after some manipulations this inequality can
be written as
(A+B)
 
2      +  2  > ✓  4    2  +  2   2    ,
one only has to check whether this inequality could be violated for ✓ = ✓¯ or
✓ = (A+B)/(2  ). The inequality then is reduced to  2(2  ) > 0, which
holds true as far as   > 0.
As for a tax policy by contrast one has that the global change in emis-
sions is negative if  q2(t) +   q1 < 0 where  q2(t) is given by (15). The
expression for the global change in emissions then becomes
 q(t) =  
A+B   ✓(2   )
(2   )(2   2) +  
✓
✓   A+B
2   
◆
,
or, letting   1 = (2   )(2   2), one has
 q(t) =   [A+B   ✓(2   )]    2 +     2  
Since   is positive and since the term (A+B)  ✓(2   ) is positive for the
admissible levels of ✓, one has that a global reduction can be obtained only
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if   <  (2  2). This last inequality can be violated for low values of   and
high values of  . Hence increases in global emissions obtained out under a
carbon tax, the larger the di↵erence (here, 1   ) in emission rate between
foreign and home firm and the higher the substitutability between goods,  .
Remark 2 If international price discrimination is allowed, an emission
permit policy never leads to higher global emissions. An equivalent carbon
tax leads to an increase in global emissions if the degree of product substi-
tutability is high and the emission rate of the home firm is low enough, with
the exact region given by the pairs ( , ) lying below the curve   =  /(1  2).
This qualifies the validity of the result obtained in Section 2. The results
for carbon leak and for global emissions hinge upon the underlying price
adjustments: under either policy, both the domestic and the foreign firm
prices increase; however, the price increase under a standard is higher than
under a tax, with the corresponding decrease in the quantities produced and
in particular by firm 2, reducing the leakage.
3.3 Trade balance
In this section, we quantify the trade gains/losses following the unilateral
implementation of the environmental policy in country H. We define trade
balance as either the di↵erence in imported and exported quantities or the
net balance in terms of values. For simplicity, we assume that the two
markets have equal size, that is A = B = M ; here the maximum value for
✓ is ✓¯ = 2M/(2    ). The trade balance of the baseline setting is exactly
equal to 0.
As for traded volumes, the trade balance under a tax or an emission
permit are, respectively, given by
TBQt =
(1 +  ) ((2   )✓   2M)
2(2   2)
TBQs = (1/4)((2 +  )✓   2(1 +  )M) (17)
In the case of a carbon tax, the implementation of a unilateral environ-
mental policy worsens, relatively to the baseline setting, the trade balance
of the regulated country which becomes a net-importer for any value of  .
In the case of a standard policy instead, the regulated country can become
a net exporter, according to the value taken by ✓: if this is close enough to
the maximum, 2M/(2   ), the country becomes a net exporter. The exact
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range of values for ✓ for which this is the case is 2M(1+  )/(2+  ) < ✓ < ✓¯
or ✓ in (✓˜( ), ✓¯( )), where both the lower and upper bounds of the interval
are increasing functions of  . The gap ✓¯( )   ✓˜( ) widens as   increases,
namely as substitutability increases. In practical terms, even an important
percentage reduction in emissions can be achieved while leading to an im-
provement in the trade balance in volumes by using a standard, provided  
is high enough - think of industries like cement, or steel. For instance, a sim-
ulation shows that   equal to 0.5 allows a percentage reduction of slightly
more than 10% in emissions while guaranteeing an improvement in trade
volumes.
Then, we take it that the e↵ect of a tax on the trade balance is negative
and that of a standard is positive - and, as it can be easily seen, in the
extreme range of policies for which it is negative, less detrimental than that
of a tax. Therefore the results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 For any level of   in (0,1), the trade balance in volumes of
the regulated country worsens if a carbon tax is implemented. The trade bal-
ance under a carbon tax is always worse than under a standard. By contrast
a standard can improve or deteriorate the trade balance: an improvement is
more easily achieved the higher is   and the lower the target reduction in
emissions.
The second comparison considers instead the trade balance in values as
resulting from the two policies. The balances are given by
TBV t =  
 
4   2  ✓2 + 4(1 +  )2M2   8(1 +  )✓M + 2 3✓M
4(2   2)2
TBV s =  
 
4   2  ✓2 + 4(1 +  )2M2   8(1 +  )✓M
16 (1   2) .
The numerator in the trade balance for a standard, TBV s,h, is decreasing
in ✓ as far as ✓ < ✓¯ =M/(2   ), therefore one has a su cient condition for
trade balance in value under a standard to be negative by verifying that for
✓ =M/(2   ) the numerator is positive, which turns out to be true for all
values of  . Similarly, for TBV t,h, the same properties apply.
Accordingly, in either case the regulated country experiences a trade
deficit in terms of values, resulting in a worsening with respect to the unreg-
ulated situation. To understand which of the two policies is less detrimental
to the trade balance in values, one can take the di↵erent between the abso-
lute values of TBV t,h and TBV s,h.
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  TBt    |TBs| =  3      2   4  ✓2   4( 2 +  )2M2 + 8(  + 1)✓M  16 (2   2)2 (1   2) (18)
The numerator in (18) is increasing and concave in ✓. However, for   = 0
the expression is zero and there is obviously no di↵erence between the two
policies; for   > 0 the numerator is positive for all values of ✓ in the interval
(⇢1( ), ✓¯( )), where ⇢1( ) =
 
4   2 2M(1 +  ) and negative for 0 < ✓ <
⇢1. Hence for ⇢1( ) < ✓ < ✓¯, the deficit under a tax exceeds that under
a standard, while the reverse holds for ✓ below ⇢1( ), namely for desired
percentage reductions larger than
 
✓¯   ⇢1
 
/✓¯. We can then summarize the
result for trade deficits in values as follows.
Proposition 4 When firms can price discriminate across countries, for a
reasonable range of desired reductions in emissions, losses from trade in
values are higher under a carbon tax than under an emission permit, if the
degree of substitution is low; if instead the degree of substitution is higher
than 0.78 the tax results in lower trade deficits than a standard for any
desired emission reduction.
A more precise statement is that, for a given desired percentage reduc-
tion, the di↵erence is in favor of a standard as   is decreased below 0.78.
Above about   = 0.78 the di↵erence is always in favor of a tax. The allowed
percentage reduction that makes a standard better than a tax in terms of
trade balance in values is provided by the graph below, where x on the
horizontal axis represents  . Clearly, for   higher than 0.78 the trade bal-
ance reduction is lower with a tax for any desired percentage reduction in
emissions. A reduction of 10% leads to lower trade deficit under a standard
provided   is below about 0.7, as displayed in Figure 2.
4 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the existing literature on anti-pollution poli-
cies by comparing the e↵ects, in terms of carbon leakages and trade flows,
of two alternative policy instruments that can be unilaterally implemented
by an industrialized country, namely a carbon tax and an emission permit
policy. Carbon leakages (and job leakages) are an argument against envi-
ronmental policies in the U.S. and other industrialized countries where some
sectors are heavily exposed to competition from less developed countries. In
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Figure 2: Percentage reduction
general, leakages are a serious issue in evaluating the real e↵ectiveness of
anti-pollution policies at a global scale (e.g. Morgenstern, 2009). They are
also relevant at a national level when regulation is incomplete.
We analyze an international duopoly with price competition and di↵eren-
tiated products. We do not consider relocation of plants (which are medium
or long-term decisions), but only production changes and the implied emis-
sions. A carbon tax leads to the expected results in terms of carbon leak,
with a carbon leak that may even worsen, at the global level, the result of
a unilateral policy. A standard policy provokes a leak only under extreme
conditions, namely for unlikely large targeted reductions, otherwise it causes
a reduction of emissions abroad as well as at home. Interestingly, the home
country then functions as a global regulator in this case. Of course we do
not want to stress this particular result as it may be due to the specificity of
our model, while the more general argument we propose is that standards
are more e cient than taxes in the presence of incomplete regulation and of
oligopolistic price competition. The di↵erent e↵ects of the two policies arise
because, under a standard, the firm in the unregulated country can expect
the regulated firm to have to abide to the regulation and therefore to aban-
don its best reply function in order to raise prices and curtail production
(and therefore emissions). This amounts to let the unregulated firm act as a
Stackelberg leader in a two stage game. Under a tax, instead, firms behave
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as Bertrand competitors in the usual sense; the regulated firm, then, is only
penalized as having a higher cost than without a tax.
We have considered two di↵erent scenarios: in the baseline one, firms
are not discriminating between the two countries, and they charge the same
price in the home and foreign country. In a more generalized version, we let
instead both firms discriminate by charging two di↵erent prices. We measure
the carbon leakage by the increase in production abroad - which brings
along an increase in emissions abroad hampering the global e↵ectiveness of
the antipollution policy. In either case, we observe that a greater carbon
leakage occurs under a carbon tax. An increase in global emissions after a
carbon tax (Feddersen, 2012) cannot be ruled out in the full fledged two-
country model, while it never occurs under a standard policy. In this sense,
perverse results of environmental policies seem to be by far less likely under
a standard than under a tax.
As to the e↵ects on trade balance, in the 2 country framework, the carbon
tax worsens the trade balance in volumes of the regulated country while
the standard policy leads to an improvement if the degree of substitution
between the two goods is high enough, otherwise it leads to a worsening.
However a tax policy is always leading to worse trade balance in volumes
for the home country than an equivalent standard. The results for trade
in values are slightly but interestingly di↵erent. First, the trade balance
in values deteriorates under either policy. Second, taxes are better than a
standard if the two goods are close substitutes. Therefore there can be a
trade-o↵ in the choice of a policy, but only if goods are close substitutes: in
that case if the Government in the home country is willing to avoid deficits
in values it should prefer a tax over a standard, if it aims at avoiding leakages
in volumes and in emissions it should prefer a standard.
Annexes
I Carbon leak: the Maquilladoras example
In order to illustrate the e↵ects of a permit policy on the mechanics of
inter-firm competition in gradually increasing complexity, we also consider
an intermediate case, with only firm 1 selling in both markets and price
discriminating across countries. Firm 2, located in country F, instead, only
produces for export and only sells in country H - for reference, it is like a
Mexican ”Maquilladora” exporting to the U.S. Price competition results in
a triplet of prices (ph1 , p
f
1 , p
h
2). The demand functions are given by equations
(1) and (2). The equilibrium demand levels in the home country denoted
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dhi for i = 1, 2 when neither emission permits nor carbon taxes are in place,
are easily computed as dhi = A/(2  ). Production for export to the foreign
country by firm 1 is simply df1 = B/2. Hence the total output by firm 1,
denoted by qm1 , is q
m
1 = (2(A+B)   B) /(4  2 ).
As in the simplified example discussed in Section 2.2, we shall consider
the case where only country H sets limits to emissions, namely total output
by firm 1 cannot exceed s/ , and we shall assume that s is chosen in such a
way as to be binding, namely we assume that the desired level of emissions,
s, be such that or s <  qm1 or ✓ < [2(A+B)   B] /(4   2 ) ⌘ ✓¯, where
✓ ⌘ s/ . Now a policy shall have an e↵ect on the composition of output by
firm H taken to be the sum of production to be sold at home and for export
to F. The constraint to firm 1 when total emission permits are equal to s is
given by the equation
(A+B) +  ph2   ph1   pf1  ✓ (19)
This constraint, plus the non-negativity constraints on the three prices, de-
scribes a region of (x, y, z) triplets in <3 with (x, y, z) = (ph1 , pf1 , ph2), as
displayed in Figure 3. The region of admissible triplets is then defined as
the set of points satisfying the non-negativity constraints and above the
(”upward sloping”) plane parametrized by the equation
z = (s/    (A+B)) /  + x/  + y . (20)
This plane intersects the vertical axis at the point (0, 0, w) where w =
(1/ ) (A+B   s/ ). It intersects the x-axis at the point x0 = ( w, 0, 0)
and the y-axis at the point y0 = (0,  w, 0). The relevant region must satisfy
the non-negativity constraints for prices and therefore coincides with the
portion of the plane lying in <3+ and delimited by the two upward sloping
rays originating from the point (0, 0, w) and crossing through x0 and y0
respectively, as depicted in Figure 2 below.
It is apparent that the price set by firm 2, ph2 , implies a restriction on the
possible choices of firm 1, given s. Hence the final constraint on firm 1 de-
pends (also) upon ph2 , as it was the case under the simplified model analyzed
above. In this more general set up, the final constraint is expressed as a set
defined by the intersection of two planes: the upward sloping plane described
by (20) and the horizontal plane of points with coordinates (x, y, ph2). By
choosing ph2 firm 2 sets the ”height” of the horizontal plane that intersects
with the plane with positive slope. The intersection determines a projection
on the (x, y) plane where (x, y) = (ph1 , pf1); the projection is a portion of a
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Figure 3: The Maquilladoras pricing
line with slope -1. The maximization problem for firm 1 is then:
max
ph1 ,p
f
1
(B   pf1)(pf1   c1) + (A+  ph2   ph1)(ph1   c1)
s.t. (A+B) +  ph2   s/  = ph1 + pf1
where the constraint is assumed to be binding (if it were not the case then
the policy would be ine↵ective).
Assuming c1 = 0 and no transport costs, the reaction function determin-
ing the two prices for firm 1 are:
ph1 = (1/4)(3A+B   2✓ + 3 ph2) and pf1 = (1/4)(A+ 3B   2✓ +  ph2) (21)
Interestingly, at the solution, the price that firm 1 sets in country F depends
upon the price that firm 2 sets in country H. Then, firm 2 acts as a Stackel-
berg leader and maximizes the profit function (ph2 c2)(A ph2+ ph1), where
ph1 is given by equation (21). This equilibrium price for 2 is
psh2 = A(4 + 3 ) +  (B   2✓)/(8  6 2) (22)
One can then retrieve the equilibrium prices of firm 1 by substituting the
value so obtained for ph2 into (21):
psh1 = (1/4) (u+ 3A+B   2✓) and psf1 = (1/4) (u+A+ 3B   2✓) , (23)
where u = [(3 (A(3  + 4) +  (B   2✓))] /(8  6 2).
II Derivation of demands in the 2x2 model
Letting µ = 4(2    2)(1    2) and letting z1 = (4+2  3 
2+ 4)
2µ , z2 =
 2(1+ )
2µ , z3 =
2(2  2)
2µ ; letting also k1 =
(4+3  3 2 2 3)
µ and k2 =
( (1+ ))
µ
and k3 =
 (2  2)
µ , the equilibrium prices for firm 1 and 2 can be written as:
psh1 = (B + 3A)z1  Az2   ✓z3 (24)
psf1 = (A+ 3B)z1  Bz2   ✓z3
psh2 = Ak1 +Bk2   ✓k3
psf2 = Bk1 +Ak2   ✓k3
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